Review of Related Literature and Studies
The Muslim people is a very large community now in the Philippines where they will find most in the southern part of the Philippines, almost half of the people in Mindanao is a blood related Muslim. The issues may occur in Islamic community can affect our government. By choosing the right elected officers.
Issues of Islamization in the Philippines quite facing a lot of difficulties specially in relating with the problems of Islamic dacwah in the Philippines. In 20th century some of the efforts made by Muslim scholars specially the late Ahmad Domocao Alonto since when he was elected as Senator in 1956. Alonto stablished and authored a number of Republic Acts while he was in the Senate. Others are spearheaded the Islamic awakening in the Philippines in the early 1950’s through the revival of the moribund Muslim Association of the Philippines (Mohammad Nashief Disomimba 2012).
This situation nowadays may affect the status of a Muslim, the control and equality of our government benefits the future of our Muslim friends. Whereas, more than ¾ of our population in our country is Muslim. They also dominated the northern part of the Philippines. This can simplify that the government of our country provide peace talks between Muslim community and the Philippine government.
Democracy. Well, I suppose sometimes it could be a convenient term to use. … sometimes it can be a tyranny of the majority. Not because of reason or because of what is right or what is good for the people, but basically it boils down to self-interest, but it is all sugarcoated in a way. This is democracy, we have elections. … So democracy is just a beautiful word. But in the Philippines, it is sadly abused (Professor at Notre Dame University Cotabato, interviewed in Cotabato, April 2009).
Although the relationship between Muslim and government is good there are some inequality connection when it comes to financial problems that can cause a big vast to the two community.
Income inequality has continued to persist even in Asian economic giants1 like Singapore and China albeit considerable reduction in absolute poverty. For the past two decades, income inequality in the East Asian region2 has risen by over 20 percent, which largely contributed to persistence of poverty in the region (NEAT, 2015).
In the case of the Philippines, income inequality has been following a generally downward trend since 1998. After reaching its peak at 0.5183 in 1997 (during the height of the Asian Financial crisis), the Gini coefficient had consistently been going down from 0.5045 in 2000 to 0.4714 in 2012—the lowest point so far during the covered period of 1991-2012 (Figure 1). This downward trend largely reflects the income distribution in urban areas. On the other hand, income distribution in rural areas has been on the rise since 1991. Periods of rising inequality in rural areas are 1994-1997 and 2009-2012. Arguably, this can be attributed to the bias towards urban and coastal areas but against rural and inland regions due to emergence of new economic opportunities brought by technological change, globalization and market-oriented reforms (Yap, 2013). Decile dispersion ratio has also not significantly reduced for almost three decades. Income of the richest decile has remained around 20 times of the income of the poorest decile (Figure 2). As a result, the poverty situation in the country has not significantly improved and geographical disparity still exists.
In cases such as the Moro conflict, one cannot overstate the paramount importance of perceived historical grievances. By creating and supporting uniform historical narratives predicated upon reified and sharply distinguished historical actors, political activists are able to maintain seemingly logical and justified conclusions concerning victimization and oppression. Perhaps in an effort to swing the pendulum away from these misleading trends, recent scholarship has moved away from analytical models based predominantly on identity formation and politics. In his excellent work on Muslim integration in the southern Philippines, Patricio Abinales soundly rejects “the use of identity politics and economic change as dominant independent variables” in analyzing the Mindanao conflict (Abinales, 2000, pp. 2-3).
In their place the author offers an extremely insightful study that disaggregates the processes of state formation in the Philippines and localizes integration struggles to the “peripheries” where social, political, and religious distinctions are negotiated and defined (Ibid., p. 14). Abinales’s case studies involving ambivalent relationships between the fledgling Philippine state and local strong men reveal discourses of power independent of homogenizing classifications. His findings severely undermine appeals to historic, or current, ethno-religious identities, and negate notions of an imperially constructed conflict.
There are no government policies that clearly discriminate Muslims, but policies are mainly formulated according to popular demands pertaining to the majority. Given that majority of the population of the country are Christians; policies tend to become biased in favor of the preponderance (Lingga, 2004).
The last few decades have witnessed a global increase in the public presence of religion in political life, both in the national and trans-national spheres (Casanova 1994). This is especially true of Muslim societies where the turn towards politicized religious identities has been more marked, making ?Muslim Politics’– ?the competition and contest over both the interpretation of religious symbols and control of the institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain them? (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 5) – a central feature of political activity (Esposito 1998; Jones 2007; Roy 2004; Wickham 2002).
As of September 2015, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had recruited nearly 30,000 people from outside of Iraq and Syria, and an estimated 5,000 of that total came from Western countries (Schmitt ; Sengupta, 2015). These data should cause us to ask why ISIS’ recruiting of non-Syrians and non-Iraqis has been so successful, especially among citizens of Western states. This paper will serve as the theoretical foundation for a larger project examining the rise of ISIS, the role of identity in its recruiting, and how ISIS uses its propaganda and published works for perpetuating a religious nationalist message targeting specific audiences who hold particularly weak social and national identities. I argue that social identity provides a lens through which we can build a theoretical framework for understanding why an individual, especially a Westerner, would feel compelled to join the ranks of ISIS. An induvial who feels alienated and marginalized from the Western society in which he resides will fail to acquire a strong national identity; consequently, he will seek out a national identity with which he can finda sense of meaning, belonging, and purpose. I further argue that ISIS has, as an organizational strategy, marketed itself as a religious nationalist movement built around the goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate.
The role of Islam has become a key public and political concern in recent years and this development has resulted in a growing interest in Muslim religiosity as the subject of empirical social research. How religious are Muslims? What influence does Muslim piety exert on political opinions? Is Muslim religiosity an obstacle to social integration? There is considerable demand for answers to questions like these, and to date several surveys have been carried out among Muslims living either in the Muslim world or in the Western diaspora (e.g. Pew Research Center 2007; Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007; Hassan 2008).
Muslims believe in Quran’s Aijaz (distinguished and miraculous nature) in terms of its meaning and spiritual uplift it provides. Arabic is considered to be the most comprehensive language (AdDausaree, 2006) in terms of depth and width of words and meanings. Judah Ibn Tibbon, who is known as ‘father of translators’ for his works in Arabic-to-Hebrew translation (Jewish Virtual Library, 2002; Sela, 2003, p. 140), explains the high status of Arabic by mentioning it as “in fact the most comprehensive language, full of resources concerning every subject. It satisfies the necessities of all those who speak or write this language. Its expressions are exact and clear, and it reaches to the heart of all questions, much more than it is possible with Hebrew” (Sela, 2003, pp. 140–141).
Muslims began arriving to the New World as early as the 15th century during the slave trade. It was estimated that about 14 to 20 percent of enslaved West Africans were Muslims (U.S. State Department, 2010). On the other hand, Muslims? voluntary migration to the United State began between late 19th to early 20th century. A number of Middle Eastern countries like Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine contributed to such early immigration to the U.S. Since then, Muslim immigration to the country increased particularly in the post-world war II era. Most new Muslim immigrants were college students who came to study at American universities. In the end, the majority of Muslim immigration to the United States has come from Southeast Asia like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia (Schaffer, 2006; U.S. State Department, 2010).
The study employs social and social-psychological theories to examine prejudice and analyze its causes and manifestations. Unfavorable Sentiments toward Muslims in the United States can be easily tracked in a number of relevant public opinion polls, academic articles, and professional projects about Muslims and Islam in the United States Contrary to the common belief that lumps Muslim Americans in a single monolithic category, U.S. Muslims are in fact among the most diverse groups in society (Schaffer 2006). Virtually, diversity underlines everything about Muslim Americans in terms of times of arrival, points of origin, ancestral background, and religious beliefs and practices (David, 2004).